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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
2329, under which the matrimonial regime may not be altered
conventionally during marriage. The case in any event illustrates
the nullity of partitions of community assets before termination
of the regime, an all too frequent practice.' 5
OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
Although recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment has a
long and venerable history in the civil law, it still suffers from
lack of clarity. In Louisiana State Mineral Board v. Albarado,'
the court applied the principle and granted the relator (one of
the Boutte heirs in a very small amount) recovery in quantum
meruit to cover services rendered by him over a period of some
thirty years which inured to the benefit of all of the heirs. The
court of appeal had found inapplicable the so-called "fund" doc-
trine applied in the Interstate case,2 which permits recovery
from a fund by one whose efforts have been solely responsible
for its creation. It also found that relator had at all times acted
on the basis of contractual agreements entered into with some
of the heirs, and was motivated by the compensation provided
for therein. It did not count his action, therefore, as taken for
the benefit of all of the heirs so as to support recovery on the
theory of unjust enrichment. In the earlier case of Succession
of Kernan,3 attorneys who had succeeded in securing a judgment
invalidating a particular legacy were denied recovery against
other legatees who had refused to employ them. This holding
was apparently distinguished by the Supreme Court in the in-
stant case on the ground that the attorneys in Kernan rendered
15. When incorporated in judgments of separation or divorce, of course, the
provisions of such null conventional partitions become effective as judicial parti-
tions. They cannot be ratified as conventional partitions, for ratification would
render them effective as of the date on which they were made, a time at which
they were forbidden as a matter of public order. On the other hand, there is no
reason why the provisions of such null conventional partitions might not be in-
corporated into a new act entered into after separation or divorce and effective
as of its proper date.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 248 La. 551, 180 So. 2d 700 (1965).
2. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 235 La. 825, 106 So. 2d 276 (1958).
On this point the opinion of the Supreme Court was in accord.
3. 105 La. 592, 30 So. 239 (1901).
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their services exclusively for the persons who had employed them.
Such a distinction, although of significance with respect to the
quasi-contract of negotiorum gestio, which requires that the
gestor act for the benefit of the dominus, does not seem appro-
priate to the problem of recovery on the basis of unjust enrich-
ment stemming from the Roman action de in rem verso.4 In its
strict form, negotiorum gestio permits recovery of useful ex-
penses when the gestor acts for the benefit of the dominus and
not over his permissible objection, whether or not a benefit re-
sults. Under a broad theory of unjust enrichment the stated
limitations are not applicable and recovery may be based on a
patrimonial enrichment without cause, accompanied by another's
loss. Instead of being concerned with whether or not services
of the kind in question are rendered exclusively for the persons
who have engaged them, it might be more justifiable to ask
(1) whether there is a legal cause for an enrichment that results
from the rendition of services by the claimant under contract
with another, and (2) whether the enrichment is to be counted
as a direct rather than an indirect and incidental result of the
services rendered. The Kernan case found that the benefit to
the other heirs was indirect and consequential. The instant case
suggests that the enrichment was not supported by a legally
justifiable cause and, also, that it was direct. it thus seems to
extend the theory of unjust enrichment beyond the former juris-
prudence. The ultimate policy issue raised by cases like Albarado
and Kernan is whether the view that no one shall be made the
debtor of another against his consent should override the moral
maxim of the law that no one should enrich himself at the ex-
pense of another. 5 The opinion recognized that the payments
due for the services were actually owed by the heirs. Recovery
against the succession was permitted to avoid delay.
In Wagenvoord Broadcasting Co. v. Canal Automatic Trans-
mission Serv.,6 an order for radio advertising, solicited by an
agent of the broadcasting company, was subject to acceptance
in writing by the offeree broadcasting company. A revocation
of the order a few hours after it was given was held effective
notwithstanding that in the meantime it had been accepted in
4. See Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law,
36 TuL. L. REV. 605 (1962), 37 TuL. L. REV. 49 (1962) ; Payne v. Scott, 14 La.
Ann. 760 (1859) ; Garland v. Scott, 15 La. Ann. 143 (1860).
5. Cf. Young v. Coen, 53 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
6. 176 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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writing as required. The conclusion was that acceptance of an
offer requires communication and that there had been no com-
munication of the acceptance prior to the revocation. It was
further held that a reasonable time for acceptance had been
allowed. Although communication of an acceptance may be
counted as contemplated generally by the Civil Code as essential
to the formation of a contract, the jurisprudence and French
authority are indecisive. In addition, the Code does not preclude
a contrary agreement on the part of the offeror. This latter
possibility seems not to have been pressed upon the court. Grant-
ing, however, that the offeror had not dispensed with notifica-
tion, it is by no means clear that a period as brief as a few hours
should be counted as the "reasonable time ... from the circum-
stances of the case he [the proposer] may be supposed to have
intended to give to the party to communicate his determination. ' ' 7
When parties are dealing face to face, immediate acceptance
may be contemplated, and, consequently, required, but when they
are at a distance from each other consideration may well be
given to ordinary business practices in determining what con-
stitutes a reasonable time for communication. It seems doubtful
that business people will normally act with the dispatch required
by the instant opinion. Notwithstanding these observations,
solicited orders on forms provided by the solicitor that become
contracts when later signed by some official may not reflect a
real or true intention on the part of the person solicited and
can constitute traps for the unwary. If such a practice is neces-
sary for the protection of the principal, prompt action by him
may be required also for the protection of the person solicited.
In Kirkland v. Fauhaber, the court was very liberal in treat-
ing an exchange of two letters as constituting an offer and ac-
ceptance covering the sale of 160 acres of land by defendant to
plaintiff. There is sound authority against interpreting parties
into a contractual status,9 but there is no indication in the
opinion that this view was presented to the court.
The ultimate justification for permitting a third person to
bring suit on a contract between others is that it protects his
reasonable expectations as well as those of the promisee and
also because it affords a direct way of enforcing a performance
7. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1809.
8. 175 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
9. -See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 72 (1936) ; United States v. Braunstein,
75 F. Supp. 137 (D.C.N.Y. 1947).
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in accordance with the agreement of the parties. If performance
by A of a promise he makes to B would be of benefit to C by way
of discharging an obligation owed to him by B, and if A has
reason to know that the benefit is contemplated by B as one of
the latter's motivating causes in contracting, C should be treated
as the beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui. There is no re-
quirement that the benefit to the third party be the sole moti-
vating cause of the stipulation. Such a view would preclude the
recognition of a right in any third party other than a sole or
donee beneficiary. The Louisiana Civil Code does not so restrict
the principle;1° nor does the jurisprudence. The right of a mort-
gagee against one who has assumed payment of the indebtedness,
a common example of such a case, is beyond. question.
The foregoing observations are prompted by the case of
Soileau v. Yates Drilling Co.," in which differing views were
expressed concerning the existence of a stipulation pour autrui.
If the drilling contractor promised to "protect, indemnify, and
save harmless" the lessee against all claims of the landowner
resulting from the contractor's negligent acts or omissions, a
performance in favor of the landowner would seem necessarily
to have been contemplated. Also, if the landowner is not recog-
nized as a third party beneficiary and the obligations owed by
the lessee to him are not satisfied by the drilling contractor, then
the landowner's recourse would have to be against the lessee and
the latter in turn would have to sue the contractor. By recog-
nizing a right in the landowner against the contractor, one suit
may take the place of two, and the contractor's promise will be
directly enforced and the lessee saved harmless as contemplated.
Another third party beneficiary problem was dealt with in
the case of Gateway Barge Line, Inc. v. Tyler Co. 12 Plaintiffs,
who had rented certain equipment to a subcontractor on a high-
way project, sought to recover unpaid rentals from the surety on
the subcontractor's bond. There is general agreement that words
of condition in such a bond should be construed as words of
promise. Although the opinion does not disclose the exact word-
ing, the bond which named the principal contractor as obligee
appears to have been conditioned only on the performance of
10. LA. CIVIL CoDF art. 1890.
11. 183 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
12. 175 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). See also Carrand Marine, Inc.
v. R. V. Tyler Co., 175 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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the contract by the subcontractor. However, the mentioned con-
tract obligated the subcontractor to furnish a bond guaranteeing
specifically the payment of materials, labor, and the rental of
equipment. That is, the condition of the bond called indirectly
for the payment to plaintiff of amounts due for rentals. It was
held that the plaintiff equipment lessors did not have a cause
of action against the surety as third party beneficiaries of the
bond. The cases cited in the court's opinion may be counted as
authority for the decision, yet other decisions continue to leave
the legal area in question involved in doubt.13 Although a con-
tract of suretyship is to be strictly construed, authority is not
lacking for the view that facts like the present should be held
legally sufficient to support recovery by the third parties identi-
fied directly or indirectly by the condition.14
In the case of Roberts v. Hayes,'5 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the jurisprudence dealing with oral agreements of joint
venture or partnership by holding that parol evidence is not
admissible to prove ownership of the stock of a corporation in
the name of which a mineral lease interest was acquired by a
partnership or joint venture formed orally for the purpose of
securing mineral leases. Tlhe claim by plaintiff was that his co-
partner had acquired a certain mineral lease through a corpora-
tion formed by the latter for the purpose, and that, in conse-
quence, the stock of the corporation belonged to the partnership.
The position of the court, in substance, was that, although owner-
ship of corporate stock is subject to proof by parol, since direct
ownership of a mineral interest by a partnership or joint venture
formed orally cannot be established, neither can ownership of
such an interest be established indirectly through proof of the
ownership of corporate stock.
In Long v. Matthews,16 the court rejected parol evidence to
support a claim of compensation between a debt due a deceased
person and amounts previously advanced to him. It relied on
La. R.S. 13:3721, which precludes the use of parol evidence to
13. See Lichtentag v. Feitel, 113 La. 931, 37 So. 880 (1905) ; Bickham v.
Womack, 181 La. 837, 160 So. 431 (1935).
14. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 800, 801 (1950); Smith, Third Party Bene-
ficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
The case of Campti Motor Co. v. Jolley, 10 La. App. 287, 120 So. 684 (1929),
which the court relied on as a "typical decision" in this area of the law, is therein
criticized adversely.
15. 248 La. 682, 181 So. 2d 390 (1965).
16. 186 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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prove a debt of the deceased if no suit was brought against him
prior to his death "unless suit to enforce the debt or liability" is
instituted against the succession within one year of its opening.
At the same time the court approved the use of parol to prove
the payment of a debt owing to the deceased. The ruling of the
court on the first issue is not free of doubt. Legal compensation
takes place by operation of law when two debts, equally liquidated
and demandable, exist simultaneously. According to the redactors
of the Code Napoleon, the effects of compensation derive from
two propositions, viz., that compensation is (1) a double pay-
ment, and (2) a forced payinent. 17 From this point of view,
proof that compensation took place is simply proof of payment.' 8
It is not at all clear why a person should be permitted to prove
by parol that he paid a debt to a decedent and yet not be able to
prove in such fashion that compensation had taken place. Fur-
thermore, it appears probable that the purpose of the statutory
provision was to prevent proof of a debt or liability of the de-
ceased in order to collect on it. It deals with "a suit to enforce
the debt or liability." A claim of compensation offered by way
of defense bears no relationship to such a suit. Indeed, a person
might not likely contemplate suit to enforce a debt that he con-
sidered had been discharged by compensation.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
The problem of differentiating between what constitutes a
breach of contract and a breach of the implied warranty against
redhibitory vices or defects has not been adequately resolved by
the jurisprudence. It is an important one because the period of
prescription for breach of contract is ten years, whereas the
redhibitory action is subject to a basic period of one year. Also,
damages for a breach of contract are measured by losses sus-
17. 2 HENRI, L ON AND JEAN MAZEAUD, LEVONS DE DROIT CIVIL no 1154
(1962) ; 2 PLANIOL, CivmI LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE), no. 588 (1960).
18. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1005 (1960), which treats com-
pensation as a method of extinguishment and consequently an affirmative defense.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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